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Law of the Sea: Expression
of Solidarity
MHIMR S. BALL*
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), by experimentally realizing consensus, has
served as a medium for transcultural negotiation of meaning.
Even if it produces no treaty or merely legitimates the division of
most of the oceans, the Conference will nevertheless have renewed
our hope for the expression of human solidarity and a correspon-
dent commonality of the seas.
INTRODUCTION
The ocean has always stood for other realities; it exerts a hold
upon our imagination for, as Augustine observed, the sea is the
figure "of the surgings and restlessness of human life."1 The law
of the sea shares this figurative quality. As first stated in its mod-
ern form by Hugo Grotius, a legal regime of freedom of the seas
reflects the natural order according to which the oceans and the
winds, by providing one nation with access to another, are the
"bond of human fellowship."2 A new law of the sea is replacing
the Grotian order in a world that has replaced the world of Gro-
tius. I propose that some elements of the new regime may be
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made to serve, as did some from the old, the bond of human
fellowship.
TRtANscuLURtAL COMMUNICATION
Grotius' world was relatively intimate. Diplomats and books
travelled freely, if slowly, across the channel. There was a lingua
franca. When Grotius made a point on the continent, it was
scored in England. Communication in the contemporary world is
more difficult. We may live in an electronic global village in
which information travels instantly, but understanding is ren-
dered more problematic; words have to bridge cultures.
In a book on metaphor, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson note
that different cultures have different conceptual systems so that
human realities vary from one culture to another3 Genuine com-
munication among people who do not share the same culture is
especially difficult. Understanding becomes possible, they say,
only through the negotiation of meaning: "you slowly figure out
what you have in common, what it is safe to talk about, how you
can communicate unshared experience or create a shared vision";
they add that, with "enough flexibility in bending your world view
and with luck and skill and charity, you may achieve some mutual
understanding."4
It is hard enough to achieve understanding through the negotia-
tion of meaning between representatives of two cultures. Com-
plexities are compounded in geometric progression as all the
nations on earth are added in. Just to establish contact requires
some doing. Grotius did not have to be concerned about being
read. Today, absent a proper patron or access to the electronic
media, a writer like Grotius and his potential public might never
get together. If they did, they would still face the need to negoti-
ate meaning. While it was easy for Grotius' pamphleteering to
find a responsive audience, one of the present essentials is an ap-
propriate surrounding, a forum. Absent a forum, a studied means
for communication, there can be little better than random, rever-
berant speech in a place of discourse. Thus, the United Nations
may provide settings for the negotiation of meaning. Certainly
the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
has been a medium for the shared attempt to create a shared re-
gime for the sea.
Lakoff and Johnson make a casual observation that, brought to
bear on UNCLOS, may help to explain how the negotiations have
3. G. LAxOFF & AL JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIvE By, 231-32 (1980).
4. Id.
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cohered so long in spite of the centrifugal forces at work. They
note that each culture has a different conceptual system so that
human aspects of reality will differ from culture to culture. But
they go on to observe that cultures do have physical contexts,
"some of them radically different-jungles, deserts, islands, tun-
dra, mountains, cities, etc. In each case there is a physical envi-
ronment that we interact with, more or less successfully. The
conceptual systems of various cultures partly depend on the
physical environments they have developed in.,,5 The sea, next to
sun and air, is the most widely shared, uniform aspect of the
physical environment. I wonder whether the conceptual systems
of diverse cultures ought not to have the greatest convergence-
or least divergence-along the front of interaction with the com-
mon factor of the sea. If so, perhaps international, multicultural
negotiations regarding the sea may thus enjoy some natural, co-
hesive predisposition to the possibility of mutual understanding.
It may also then prove possible that negotiations revolving
around the sea may constitute a further, common basis for at-
tempts at mutual understanding on other subjects. In any event,
I think it well worth noting the singular shape taken by the
conference.
Estimates of the probability of the Conference's success or fail-
ure have focused on its potential for bringing out an acceptable
work product, a treaty. A just treaty is surely a prize worthy of
the aspiring. However, my point is that even a complete failure in
extruding a convention would not compromise the significance of
the event itself as a dramatic event of law. More than longevity
distinguishes it from a brief, shining moment of Camelot; it has
been a productive laboratory, working experiments in the forms
of negotiation, multinational decisions, and transcultural dis-
course. The Conference itself promises more than any documen-
tal outcome for the prospects of a bond of human fellowship.
CONSENSUS
The most striking characteristic of the Conference is that it has
proceeded by consensus. The text has been assembled without a
vote. Consensus is of recent vintage in international bodies and
has been gaining in favor.6 As an alternative to majority rule, it
5. Id. at 146.
6. See, e.g., F. CHAI, CONSULTATION AN CONSENSUS IN THE SEcuRIrrY COUNCIL,
has commended itself especially to the minority of big powers,
now that more than 150 nations, each with one vote, participate in
balloting.
The United Nations committee which prepared the way for UN-
CLOS III itself functioned on the basis of consensus. Its report to
the General Assembly then proposed for UNCLOS MI a "Gen-
tleman's Agreement" 7 that the "Conference should make every
effort to reach substantive matters by way of consensus and there
should be no voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus
have been exhausted."8 The Gentleman's Agreement was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and then by the
Conference and appended to the Conference rules of procedure.9
The rules of procedure set out the workings of consensus. Rule
39 provides for matters of substance at the Conference to be de-
cided by a two-thirds majority; Rule 37, however, states that,
before a matter of substance is put to the vote, it shall be deter-
mined "that all efforts at reaching general agreement have been
exhausted .... ,1o And prior to making such a determination,
there are to be deferments, including a ten-day, cooling-off period
during which every effort is to be made to achieve general agree-
ment. UNCLOS III has abided by this Gentleman's Agreement
through its years and has functioned on the basis of consensus."
As practiced by this Conference, consensus has arisen from the
investment of time; development of familiarity among the dele-
gates; deft, patient leadership; flexible and floating negotiating
groups; formal and informal committee meetings; inter-sessional
UNITAR (1971); Jenks, Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple
Majorities and Consensus as Modes of Decision in International Organizations, in
CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS n INTERNATIONAL LAW, EssAYs IN HONOR OF LORD McNAIR, 48
(1965); Sohn, Voting Procedures in United Nations Conferences for the Codification
of International Law, 69 Am. J. INVT'L L. 310 (1975); Sohn, United Nations Decision
Making: Cornfrontation or Consensus? 15 HARv. Ir'L L.J. 438 (1974).
7. On the subject of these instruments generally, see Lauterpacht, Gentle-
men's Agreements, in INrERNATIONAL LAw AND EcoNoImnc ORDER 381 (Flume et al.
eds. 1977).
8. The statement was approved by the U.N. General Assembly on November
16, 1973, and then adopted by the Conference along with the rules of procedure at
Caracas on June 27, 1974. See, Sohn, Voting Procedures in United Nations Confer-
encesfor the Codification of International Law, 69 A J. INT'L L. 310, 333-51 (1975);
Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 Am. . INr'L L. 1, 3-5 (1975); Vignes, Will the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea Work According to the Consensus Rule? 69 AM. J.
IVr'L L. 119 (1975).
9. Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Rules of Procedure, Appen-
dix, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/30/Rev2 (1976).
10. Id. Rules 39, 37.
11. But see Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The Seventh Session (1978), 73 Am 3. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1979) (vote on a non-
treaty issue, a resolution confirming president's continuation in office).
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communication; and the kinds of fruitful chance encounters made
possible by convening in a genial, compact environment like that
of Geneva. Above all, consensus has depended upon a kind of
willing suspension of disbelief, the exploratory, mutual trust and
good faith of those who believe arguments may count.
Clearly, consensus is vulnerable in many spots, as UNCLOS III
has demonstrated. It is subject to manipulation: cynical maneu-
vering by forces removed from the conference table or the bad
faith of a representative sitting at it can undo the whole. It is sub-
ject to self-absorption: delegates can become their own clientele,
or professional conference boosters, or the inner circle of an ex-
clusive elite whose outer circle is a coterie of dependent, knowing
academic commentators. Consensus is also subject to oppression:
dissent by the powerless can be suppressed on the pretext of
wrapping up a "package deal," while dissent by the powerful can
be a handily exercised veto.' 2 Moreover, it is subject to diversion-
ary uses: a gradual process that occupies attention in Geneva is
good cover both for land producers to control the mineral market
as long as possible and for a powerful industry to prevent action
until deep seabed mining technology is developed and ready for
unilateral deployment.
One of the perceived weaknesses of consensus seems to consti-
tute one of its strengths. A conference which operates on the ba-
sis of consensus does not result in precise, determinative legal
texts. To achieve agreement, its products like its meetings are
open-ended. This is a strength because it is an invitation to more
of the same, a solicitation to continue the process, to keep a con-
versation going, to broaden and attract support. As has been
pointed out, the process of codifying the law is being displaced by
the process of developing and designing law for new international
realities, justice, and equity; and this displacement means that
the maximum possible support must be sought.' 3
Notwithstanding its vulnerability, as it has become possible,
consensus has become necessary in consequence of a constella-
12. As a corollary, there may be an inherent bias in favor of insiders, generally
the big powers, inasmuch as consensus rewards the party whose text or proposal
enjoys the initial provisional success. The proponent of change has the burden of
gathering a consensus against the status quo. This effect has been ameliorated by
the fact that the consensus texts were prepared by the officers of the Conference,
all of whom came from small countries.
13. Sohn, Voting Procedures in United Natiow Conferences for the Codca-
tion of International Law, supra note 6, at 353.
tion of developments: increasing interdependence among nations,
adoption of democratic practices in formal international
processes, and the coming of age of parliamentary diplomacy.14
But consensus owes its existence mostly to that contemporary
phenomenon whereby huge military force has grown unimagin-
ably fearsome in direct proportion to the increasing political im-
potence of those who wield it. This irony for the large nations has
become evident at the same time that effective means have be-
come available to small nations for expressihg their own ideologi-
cal unity in dissent. Thus it has become "necessary in any
discussion of international law-which itself is designed to per-
suade the reader and not to force him to accept a position-to as-
sume equality of states before the law and genuine reciprocity."'
5
Consensus is the form assumed by negotiations among those who
are equal and whose equality is expressed in the willingness to
persuade and be persuaded by each other.
Not surprisingly, because it has been the mode of decision-mak-
ing followed by UNCLOS III, consensus has been projected into
the future as a mode of decision-making for the Conference's
progeny. The text provides that an amendment Conference,
should one be called in the future, is to proceed by consensus.' 6
The UNCLOS text also provides for the proposed Council of the
International Sea-Bed Authority to decide certain reserved and
critical questions only by consensus.17
For the purposes of the Council's decisions, the text defines
"consensus" with deceptive simplicity. It is "the absence of any
formal objection."' 8 Heretofore it has been thought that consen-
sus was undefinable, maybe one of its most endearing qualities.
What follows the text's concise definition, and elaborates on its
mechanics, is more revealing of the elusive subtleties entailec
Within 14 days of the submission of a proposal to the Council the Presi-
dent shall ascertain whether there would be an objection to the proposal if
it were put to the Council for adoption. If the President of the Council as-
certains that there would be an objection to a proposal before the Council,
he shall constitute a Conciliation Committee consisting of not more than
nine members, with himself as Chairman, for the purpose of reconciling
the differences and producing a proposal which can be adopted by consen-
sus. The President shall establish the said committee within three days
following such ascertainment. The Conciliation Committee shall work ex-
14. On the subject of parliamentary diplomacy see Jessup, Parliamentary Di-
plomacy: An Examination of the Rules of Procedure of Organs of the United Na-
tions, 89 RECUEIL DES COURS 181 (1956) (Jessup notes that the term
"parliamentary diplomacy" was first suggested by Dean Rusk).
15. D'Amato, On Consensus, 8 CAx. Y.B. INT'L L. 104, 117 (1970).
16. Draft Convention of the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L78, art
312(2), Annex 6 (art. 42) (Aug. 28, 1981).
17. Id. art. 161(7)(D).
18. Draft Convention, supra note 16, art 161(7) (e).
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peditiously and report to the Council within 14 days. If the Conciliation
Committee is unable to recommend a proposal which can be adopted by
consensus it shall, in its report, set out the grounds on which a proposal is
being opposed.19
The last sentence of the quoted passage indicates the animating
guidance of consensus in complex multicultural negotiation on
highly-charged, political-economic subjects. If a consensus propo-
sal cannot be found, the grounds of the objection are to be pub-
lished, held up to general public scrutiny. The immediate
pressure for reaching consensus is exposure. That is all. The sole
measure in the Council's repertory for preventing a failure of con-
sensus is the prospect of having one's objection brought into the
open. An objection will either be legitimate and have purchase
among the international public or it will not. If not, it will pre-
sumably draw the censure of the audience. That is to say that the
prospects for consensus are impelled by nothing more than the
force which backed Grotius' Mare Liberum, i.e. the power of
persuasion.
Consensus is mandated for the Council in one other instance
which raises the issue of the role of experts in the making of de-
cisions. The use of experts has posed interesting questions for in-
ternational law, particularly in the context of environmental
concerns.20 The UNCLOS III text provides for drawing on experts
in several circumstances. In one case, a coastal nation "taking
into account the best scientific evidence available to it, shall en-
sure through proper conservation and management measures that
the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic
zone is not endangered by over-exploitation."2' 1
Scientific experts are also to have a role in determining the lim-
its of the continental shelf. According to the 1958 Convention, a
nation's continental shelf extends to the 200 meter isobath or the
limits of exploitability.22 The latter standard was altogether too
troublesomely vague. The UNCLOS text generally provides that
the continental shelf shall extend to the "outer edge of the conti-
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Contini & Sand, Methods to Expedite Environment Protection: In-
ternational Ecostandards, 66 AAM . INT'L L. 37 (1972); Schachter & Serwer, Marine
Pollution Problems and Remedies, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 84 (1971).
21. Draft Convention, supra note 16, art. 61(2).
22. Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 1, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.LA.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964).
nental margin ... ."23 If a continental shelf clearly drops to the
abyssal plain within the 200-mile limit of the economic zone, then
there is no problem.24 But what of a continental shelf beyond 200
miles? Would it not then encroach upon the deep seabed? The
determination of where the continental margin lies, beyond 200
miles, is both important and not obvious.25 Accordingly, the text
provides that, in these circumstances, experts shall be brought
into the reckoning.26 The coastal nation shall mark its limits "on
the basis of" recommendations made by a proposed Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to be composed of experts
in geology, geophysics or hydrography.27
The most interesting UNCLOS referral to experts is a provision
that links experts and consensus and relates to plans of work for
a deep seabed mining. A nation-sponsored party wishing to mine
nodules must submit a plan of work, a contract, which meets a va-
riety of specifications spelled out in the text.28 The plan of work
is first reviewed by the experts of the fifteen-member Legal and
Technical Commission. The Commission then makes its recom-
mendation for approval or disapproval to the Council. Whether a
contract is to be entered into and an applicant allowed to mine
depends upon the following provision for consensus governing the
Council's decision:
(i) If the Commission recommends the approval of a plan of work, it
shall be deemed to have been approved by the Council if no Council
member submits to the President within 14 days a specific written
objection alleging non-compliance with the [applicable] require-
ments .... In the event that there is an objection, the conciliation
procedure [which I have quoted above] shall apply. If, at the end of
the conciliation process, the objection to the approval of the plan of
work is still maintained, the plan of work shall be deemed to have
been approved by the Council unless the Council disapproves it by
consensus among its members excluding the State or States, if any,
making the application or sponsoring the applicant;
(li) If the Commission recommends the disapproval of a plan of work or
does not make a recommendation, the Council may decide to ap-
prove the plan of work by a three-fourths majority... 29
In effect, this provision for consensus heavily weights the Legal
and Technical Commission's recommendation for approval. The
assumption is that a contract that satisfies the technicalities in
23. Draft Convention, supra note 16, art. 76(1).
24. The complete provision on the continental shelf states, "or to a distance of
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to
that distance." Id.
25. See id. art. 76(4).
26. Id. art. 76(8); id. Annex IL
27. Id. Annex IA art. 2.
28. See id. Annex HIL
29. Id. art. 162(j).
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the (presumably objective) judgment of the experts should pro-
ceed unless there is considerable opposition; an opponent would
have to meet the high standard of assembling a consensus against
it.
The immediate purpose of the provision is to allay the fears of
prospective operators who might think that their plans of work
would be subject to disapproval on non-technical, purely political
grounds. It is of particular interest because of its solution to the
problem of the interplay of experts and political judgment. It
gives priority to expert judgment but keeps this judgment within
the ultimately political context allowed by consensus.
Undeniably, decisions regarding the sea and its resources have
been improved by utilizing advances made possible by the sci-
ences, both the hard sciences like biology and the quasi-theologi-
cal sciences like economics. The management of fisheries, for
example, has benefited from scientific improvements. UNCLOS
I, however, has made clear the fact that the sea is ultimately a
political issue. That is, decisions regarding the sea are not for ex-
perts only, be they experts in science, law or diplomacy. There is
no critical mass of facts that will make decisions for us; judg-
ments are necessary, and the final judgments are political. This is
not to say that fact and expert are to be excluded. Not at all. Ex-
perts cannot make our decisions for us but can improve the deci-
sions which it is for us to make. The Draft Convention deploys
consensus so as to allow both expert and political judgment.
It is understandable that UNCLOS proposes that these and
other critical decisions be made by consensus. Consensus has
been observed by this Conference and commends itself to the fu-
ture. However, consensus is not the only standard proposed. De-
pending upon the subject matter, Council decisions are also to be
taken by votes ranging from a simple majority to two-thirds to
three-fourths.30 And substantive votes of the Assembly are to be
determined by a double majority, i.e. two-thirds of those "present
and voting" provided that such a majority includes a majority of
those "participating in that session of the Assembly."31 None of
these instances represents the abandonment of consensus; con-
sensus still forms the core. The system of voting by tiered majori-
30. Id. art 161(7).
31. Id. art. 159(6).
ties is a way of maintaining the core by allowing less rigorous
modalities for matters of less importance or less controversy.
A CONCILIATION METHOD
The projection of consensus into the future would allow for a
kind of Conference on the law of the sea in continuous session.
This afterlife of the Conference would also be supported in a fur-
ther way. I have noted that consensus does not produce determi-
native, precise legal texts. Certainly this has been true in the
present instance. The Draft Convention, in an attempt to achieve
agreement, has been left open-ended in many respects. One of
the reasons for the care lavished on the decisional structure for
proposed future organizations is that they will have jurisdiction
over questions unresolved by this Conference.
If the Conference finally produces a recommended convention
and so takes a sabbatical from negotiation, it will necessarily
leave a text that is generative of the need for further multilateral
negotiation and decision-making in the ways that I have outlined.
Such a text will also generate problems whose solution involves
only two or a few nations and not all. Negotiations involving
many nations would not be called for. The drawing of a marine
boundary line between two nations is an example. For the judi-
cial resolution of such controversies, the UNCLOS text proposes
the Law of the Sea Tribunal with its Sea-Bed Disputes Cham-
ber.32 Nations have traditionally been reluctant to submit dis-
putes to third-party processes, especially the judicial process.
Among the prominent reasons for this reluctance is the prefer-
ence of nations, invoking their sovereignty, for unilateral
determinations.
Not the least intriguing aspect of the UNCLOS recommenda-
tions are those for pre-judicial, or non-judicial, dispute settlement.
The text brings almost all disputes within the possibility of concil-
iation. Practically, conciliation is less formal, less time-consuming
and less costly than judicial or arbitral proceedings.33 Concep-
tually, conciliation is the complement to consensus. It depends
32. Id. Annex VL See generally, e.g., Adede, Settlement of Disputes Arising
Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 798 (1975); Adede, Law of
the Sea-The Integration of the System of Settlement of Disputes Under the Draft
Convention as a Whole, 75 ALL J. INT'L L. 84 (1978); Sohn, Settlement of Disputes
Arising out of the Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO L REv. 495 (1975); Sohn, Settle-
ment of International Disputes Relating to Deep Sea-Bed Mining, in FEsTscrmFT
FOR RUDOLF BINDSCHEDLER (1980). Comment, Settlement of Fisheries Disputes in
the Exclusive Economic Zone, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (1979).
33. See Sohn, The Role of Conciliation in International Disputes, The Fine
Print, May 1, 1981, at 3.
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upon the same underlying mutual trust and good faith, the same
willing suspension of disbelief, brought down from the level of
multi-lateral negotiation to a concrete dispute among a limited
number. Conciliation is the most consensual method for settle-
ment of the limited disputes left over by a consensually achieved,
imprecise text.
Most disputes are to be settled either by voluntary conciliation
or, failing the use or success of conciliation, by judicial or arbitral
procedures entailing binding decisions.3 4 The disputes excepted
from compulsory binding decisions are among the thorniest: cer-
tain aspects of scientific research and fishing by one party in the
economic zone of another nation; and the boundaries between na-
tions of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf. In these instances, compulsory conciliation may be invoked
by any party to the dispute, and the other party or parties must
join in submitting the dispute to a conciliation commission.3 5 The
conciliation commission is to report its findings of fact and law
and "such recommendations as [it] may deem appropriate for an
amicable settlement of the dispute."3 6 But the commission's re-
port "shall not be binding upon the parties."3 7 As with the suc-
cess of consensus, so with the success of conciliation: it depends
upon the power of persuasion and the willingness to be
persuaded.
CONCLUSION
The international law of the sea began with a papally-sanc-
tioned Spanish-Portugese allotment of the whole.38 These claims,
challenged by Grotius and the dispersion of naval power, yielded
to a regime of undivided seas.39 It was not until the Truman-sanc-
tioned modern assault on the freedom of the seas that the Grotian
regime gave way.40 The acquisitive rush to dominion seems re-
34. See, Draft Convention, supra note 16, pt. XV.
35. Id. arts. 297-98.
36. Id. Annex V, art. 7(1).
37. Id. art. 7(2) (emphasis added).
38. F. DAvENPORT, EuROPEAN TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE
UNrED STATES TO 1648, at 156-63, 71-83 [papal bull.], 86-100 [tordecillas], (1967).
39. See, e.g., T. FULTON, THE SOvEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 4-5 (1911).
40. See Presidental Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R 67 (194348 Comp.), re-
printed in 59 Stat. 884 (1945). See generally E. WH1TEM A, INTERNATIONAL LAW
740-931 (1965); Hollick, U.S. Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J.
INT' L, 23 (1976).
cently to have abated but only after most of the marine store of
wealth had been divided among the claimants.
Selden had argued that instruments could be found for distin-
guishing the dominions of the seas.41 He meant the instruments
of geographers. He could not have imagined the possibility, now
seriously raised, that husbandry of fish can be effected by confin-
ing them within marine zones marked off by electric currents.
Such electric "fences" are a parable of how far the enclosure
movement has carried.42 Law has figured in this movement as a
contrivance serving division and defense-a protection of exclu-
sive franchises for exploitation.
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
may have presided over and authorized the final stages of the
closing of the seas. But such formal ceremonies have not been its
sole occupation. It has also substantively acknowledged the com-
monality of the seas by supplying the common heritage with spe-
cific content. More importantly, in my view, it has experimentally
realized consensus.
The Conference may be sabotaged by a corporate failure of will
or by one of the participating nations (the United States is the
likeliest saboteur). Or its documental results may come to noth-
ing. Nevertheless, it renews hope for the human solidarity and
the correspondent commonality of the seas exhibited in Grotius'
appeal respecting the bond of fellowship. When a single bulb has
been made to burn, however briefly or dimly, the possibility of
electric light has been demonstrated. The Conference has proven
the possibility for accomodating mutual trust, good faith and pro-
leptic belief in the efficacy of argument.43 Even if only prelimina-
41. J. SELDEn, OF THE DoMINION, OR, OWNERSHIP OF THE SEA, [book I. chap. 22]
140-41 (1972) [bk. I, chap. 22].
42. See F. CmusTY & A. ScoTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHEmIES 96-
97, 101-02 (1965).
43. In his book, SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES, Oscar Schachter discusses
standards for the equitable sharing of resources and presents a possibility for un-
derstanding the appropriation of ocean resources as a response to demands for
equity. This possibility might mean that even the division of the seas could be
construed in alignment with the kind of human solidarity and commonality I am
pursuing. Schachter points out that recognition of equity and distributive justice
among nations is attributable "not to a sudden spread of altruism, but to a widely
felt necessity on the part of governmental elites to respond to tensions and griev-
ances which threaten the equilibrium and stability of the international order." 0.
ScHAcHrER, SHARING THE WoRLD's RESOURCES 16 (1977). See id. at 143-44.
Schachter's book seems to be a more complete reading than that of Louis Hen-
kin, who believes that what has emerged from UNCLOS HI has been "at bot-
tom.. .the result of 'political vectors,"' drawn elsewhere than at the Conference.
L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 215 (1979). The law of the sea, he says, will
relfect "egoistic nationalist forces of coastal states" on the one hand, and, on the
other, the fallout from a struggle between the Third World, hard driving its New
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rily, the Conference has been a means for impressive multi-
cultural discourse.
International Economic Order, and wealthy developed nations favored by the es-
tablished system. Id. at 226-27.
Note should also be taken of the illuminating study by Keohane & Nye, Power
and Interdependence, in which the law of the sea is demonstrated as a paradig-
matic reflection of growing international interdependence, which is distinct from
"solidarity" or "commonality." Keohane and Nye point out that an order of inter-
dependence does not necessarily imply an order of greater equity and justice,
since interdependence can lead to the exploitation by the powerful of the weaker
who are dependent upon them. Where solidarity is recognized, however, exploita-
tion will not follow.
It is also incumbent upon me to acknowledge indebtedness and to pay tribute to
the seminal work of M. McDoUGAL & W. BuRxE, THE PUBUC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
(1964). McDougal and Burke view international law as a policy-oriented, political
process of authoritative decision. They have successfully brought attention to the
horizontal process of interaction among nations by which they implement and
clarify their common interest. McDougal and Burke have argued that common in-
terest would seem inescapably to lie in "an accommodation of exclusive and inclu-
sive claims which will produce the largest total output of community values at the
least cost" BuRKE & McDouGAL, Id. at 52. The inherited old order of the oceans,
they thought, had successfully accommodated the inclusive interests of all States
and the exclusive interests of coastal nations so that it did not simply balance
competing interests but also clarified and secured common interests. Professor
McDougal later stated: "With strong preferences for the protection of common
and rejection of special interests and for a balancing in favor of inclusive rather
than exclusive interests, I confess that I may appear .. a pleader for lost causes."
McDougal, The Law of the High Seas in Time of Peace, 25 NAVAL WAR CoiL. REv.
No. 3, at 35, 36 (1973). He went on to prophesy about the UNCLOS that "given the
arrogant contemporary perspectives of nationalism and misperceptions of com-
mon interest, disaster may impend." Id. at 44.
My own approach is to be distinguished from that of McDougal and Burke in
several fundamental respects, including the fact that I think the accommodation of
claims is not an adequate substitute for the negotiation of meaning and that inter-
est, even common interest, is not an adequate alternative to solidarity. Perhaps
the chief differentiating factor, however, is simply that they wrote when, not so
long ago, it could still be said that the immensity of the oceans allowed nations to
"seek their own ends by freely chosen strategies, largely without reference to the
choices made by others." BURKE & McDouGAL, supra, at 25. Although I write less
than two decades later, it has become a different epoch. If UNCLOS does legiti-
mate the division of most of the ocean, who is to say that this will have been too
great a price for the performance it has given us of solidarity in the medium of
law.

